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Metternich and Civil War in Switzerland
Barbora Pásztorová
The purpose of this study is analysis of Austrian Chancellor Metternich’s approach to-
wards the civil war in Switzerland, which ensued in 1847 between the Catholic and
Protestant cantons, and evaluation of the consequences of Metternich’s diplomatic de-
feat, for him personally and also for Austria and its relationship with the German
Confederation. Eruption of the conflict itself, its progress and its consequences will be
discussed. Metternich considered the dispute in Switzerland to be an issue for Austria,
because he believed that the radical (Protestant) cantons’ efforts to create a unified fed-
eral state could act as an impulse for the increased involvement of German nationalists
who would finally trigger a revolution in Germany. He made all possible effort to pre-
vent this development, however, his intention this time was not just to use diplomatic
means, but also armed intervention by Austria and France and he also considered using
military assistance from the states of the German Confederation. But his efforts failed,
the Sonderbund, a military defensive alliance of the seven Catholic conservative can-
tons created for the purpose of protecting the sovereignty of the cantons, was defeated
in the civil war and a new federal constitution was adopted in Switzerland. The Prince’s
fears were realised when the victory of the Swiss radicals became one of the impulses
for a revolution in Germany and Italy in 1848.
[Civil War; Switzerland; Metternich; 19th Century; Sonderbund; Swiss Confederation;
German Confederation]
Introduction
The1 disputes in relation to the issue of federal reforms, between the
radical (Protestant) and conservative (Catholic) cantons, culminated in
civil war in Switzerland. While the radical cantons wished to achieve
a closely unified federation, which would replace the loose confed-
eration of sovereign cantons, the conservative cantons endeavoured
 Department of Historical Sciences, Faculty of Arts, University of West Bohemia in
Pilsen, Sedlácˇkova 31, 301 00 Pilsen, Czech Republic. E-mail: barpas@khv.zcu.cz.
1 This study originated within the terms of the SGS-2016-048 grant, which the author
realised at the Department of Historical Sciences of the Faculty of Arts of the Univer-
sity of West Bohemia.
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to maintain a status quo due to concerns that they would lose their
sovereignty and thereby also their cultural and religious autonomy.
The first significant step towards the polarisation of forces, which re-
sulted in civil war, was the decision by the government in Aargau to
close all eight monasteries located within the territory of this canton
from January 1841. Another event, which contributed to escalation of
the situation, was the affair surrounding controversial German the-
ologist David Friedrich Strauss, to whom the government in Zurich
offered a professorship at its university at the beginning of 1839. The
last impulse for the military conflict in Switzerland was the decision
Lucerne’s Great Council to summon the Jesuits to the country. The
radical cantons, led by Aargau, subsequently requested that the Diet
banish all Jesuits from the Swiss territories. When this did not hap-
pen, they decided to enforce this request by force. Amilitary defensive
alliance was subsequently created, the so-called Sonderbund, which
was concluded by the seven Catholic conservative cantons for the pur-
pose of protecting the sovereignty of the cantons. At thismoment there
was nothing preventing armed conflict.
Austrian Chancellor Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Prince von
Metternich-Winnerburg, considered development of events leading
towards formation of a unified and centralised state in Switzerland, to
be a threat to all of Europe, particularly to the countries of the German
Confederation and Austria. He considered the dispute in Switzerland
to be an issue for Austria because he believed that the efforts of the
radical (Protestant) cantons to create a unified federal state, could act
as an impulse for the greater involvement of German nationalists, who
would trigger a revolution in Germany. He made all efforts to prevent
this development, however, his intention this time was not just to use
diplomatic means, but also armed intervention by Austria and France
and he also considered using military assistance from the states of the
GermanConfederation. But his efforts failed. The Sonderbundwas de-
feated in the civil war and a new Federal Constitution was adopted in
Switzerland. The Prince’s fears were realised when the victory of the
Swiss radicals became an impulse for a revolution in Germany and
Italy in 1848.
The issue of Metternich’s approach to civil war in Switzerland is a
topic that is not of primary interest to historians, in the Czech envi-
ronment or abroad, and there are therefore very few materials to date
20
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
B. Pásztorová,Metternich and Civil War in Switzerland
on this topic. Therefore the goal of the submitted study is analysis of
the approach by Austrian Chancellor Metternich to the civil war in
Switzerland, which ensued in 1847 between the Catholic and Protes-
tant cantons, and evaluation of the consequences of Metternich’s
diplomatic defeat, for him personally and also for Austria and its rela-
tions with the German Confederation. The causes for eruption of the
conflict, its progress and consequences will be discussed.
In 1815 the Congress of Vienna formally freed Switzerland from un-
der French rule,2 and acknowledged its existence and guaranteed its
territorial inseparability and neutrality. This meant that any European
conflict would stop at the Swiss borders and, conversely, Switzerland
was not permitted to intervene in the disputes of other countries. The
main reason on which the decision to guarantee Swiss neutrality was
based was the desire of the Great Powers to extricate this country
from under the dominant influence of its most powerful neighbour,
France. Switzerland was simultaneously permitted to determine its
own form of government.3 On 7 August 1815 the Swiss Diet ratified
the Federal Treaty. This was the third consecutive constitution that had
been guaranteed in Switzerland over the last 17 years and basically
restored it to the loose confederation of states that had existed here
before Napoleon’s intervention. The Swiss Confederation again con-
sisted of 22 cantons.4 The individual cantons were declared sovereign
entities and were also permitted to conclude alliances between each
2 Between 1798 and 1815 the so-called Helvetic Republic existed in Switzerland, which
was established here during the Napoleonic Wars. At that time the Swiss cantons
were divided into three types: territorial municipality cantons (Uri, Schwyz, Un-
terwalden, Glarus, Zug and Appenzell), municipal cantons with a professional-
aristocratic system (Basel, Bern, Fribourg, Lucerne, Schaffhausen, Solothurn and
Zurich) and newly created cantonswith a system of representative democracy, which
was however limited by the high voting census (St. Gall, Aargau, Thurgau, Ticino
and Vaud). The smaller cantons – Basel, Solothum, Aargau (the hereditary house
of Habsburg), Zurich, Thurgau and Appenzell adjoined the German Confederation.
T. Ch. MÜLLER, Die Schweiz 1847–1849. Das vorläufige, erfolgreiche Ende der „de-
mokratischen Revolution“?, in: D. DOWE – H.-G. HAUPT – D. LANGEWIESCHE
(eds.), Europa 1848. Revolution und Reform, Bonn 1998, p. 287; J. REMAK, A Very Civil
War. The Swiss Sonderbund War of 1847, Boulder – San Francisco – Oxford 1993, p. 5.
3 REMAK, pp. 12–14.
4 The term Swiss Confederation (Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft) is generally used for
Switzerland during the period before March, i.e. for the period between 1815 to 1848.
Neuchâtel (Neuenburg), Geneva and Valais became new cantons.
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other. However, these alliances were not to be directed against the
Confederation or the rights of another canton. A federal army was
also formed, which each canton was to contribute one contingent to.
A Diet (Tagsatzung) was also formed as an assembly of canton envoys,
in which each canton also had equal voting rights regardless of its
number of residents. However, because no permanent place of assem-
bly was determined, Bern, Lucerne and Zurich alternated every two
years in presiding over the Diet.5
The July revolution provided a power boost to the liberal and na-
tional powers in Switzerland, like elsewhere in Europe. However, the
Swiss liberals had the advantage that they were able to build on ex-
isting foundations – on the principle of a republican state form, self-
government and the people’s sovereignty. They gradually started to
obtain control over the governments of the cantons, which encour-
aged them to demand political changes. Assemblies immediately be-
gan to be held in many cantons and petitions and brochures began to
be published, demanding political reform. As a result, the Diet issued
a decision at the end of 1830, which enabled the cantons to perform the
necessary and purposeful changes to their constitutions. However, the
executed modifications were not permitted to be in conflict with the
Federal Treaty. This decision by the Diet dating from 27 December
1830 is generally considered the turning point symbolising the spe-
cific Swiss path of political modernisation and formation of the state,
because it confirmed the sovereignty of the people and the principle
of subsidiarity.6 Over the course of one year eleven cantons imple-
mented a new constitution and anchored a system of representative
democracy with the people’s sovereignty and division of power in it.
Over the course of a very short period the liberals enforced their con-
stitutional reforms on a cantonal level. The period this event started is
identified in Swiss history as the period of regeneration. In most can-
tons the transition to a more representative democracy was successful,
but voices of resistance could also be heard.7
5 H. MÜLLER, Im Widerstreit von Interventionsstrategie und Anpassungszwang. Die Aus-
senpolitik Österreichs und Preussens zwischen dem Wiener Kongress 1814/15 und der Fe-
bruarrevolution 1848. Studien zur Geschichte Bd. 12, Bd I., II., Berlin 1990, p. 558; H.
LUTZ, Zwischen Habsburg und Preussen. Deutschland 1815–1866, Berlin 1998, p. 308;
REMAK, p. 13; MÜLLER, Die Schweiz 1847–1849, p. 288.
6 MÜLLER, Die Schweiz 1847–1849, p. 289.
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On a federal level two attempts to reform the Federal Treaty failed
in 1832 and 1833, because of the insurmountable differences between
federalists and centralists and reformists and conservatives. The lib-
eral cantons wished to achieve a closely unified confederation, which
would replace the loose alliance of sovereign cantons. However, the
Catholic cantons were against this because they feared loss of their
sovereignty and therefore also their cultural and religious autonomy,
and also endeavoured to maintain the status quo. Thanks to their ef-
forts none of the submitted reformation proposals were passed by the
Diet. Failure of reformation of the Federal Treaty frequently resulted in
replacement of liberals by a group of their usually tougher and less pa-
tient contemporaries, the so-called radicals. These primarily endeav-
oured to separate the church from the state, which mainly meant re-
moving schooling and education from the hands of the church.8
The conservative neighbouring states felt that the existence of a
democratic Switzerland was a great threat to their own peace and se-
curity.9 This is demonstrated by the dispatch from the Prussian Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, Karl Ernst Wilhelm Freiherr von Canitz and
Dallwitz to Minister of Mecklenburg-Strelitz Johann Christoph Ferdi-
nand Louis Haenlein, which states: “The progress of events in Switzer-
land is not only a threat with the most serious consequences for the
confederation, but also for countries who are in contact with it.”10 The most
disquieting fact was that Switzerland generously provided asylum to
radicals, revolutionaries and political refugees from all of Europe and
that Swiss democracy also enjoyed great respect in Germany, partic-
ularly in its south-west territory.11 Since the July revolution in France
this small state in the centre of Europe had offered refuge not only to
many German political refugees (this mostly concerned young
academically educated radicals and early socialists of independent
7 LUTZ, p. 309.
8 A. HERMAN, Metternich, New York 1932, p. 239; D. WARD, 1848. The Fall of Metter-
nich and the Year of Revolution, London 1970, p. 101; REMAK, pp. 14 and 20; MÜLLER,
Die Schweiz 1847–1849, p. 290; LUTZ, p. 309.
9 J. INAUEN, Brennpunkt Schweiz. Die süddeutschen Staaten Baden, Württemberg und Bay-
ern und die Eidgenossenschaft 1815–1840, Fribourg 2008, p. 121.
10 Canitz to Haenlein, Berlin, 9. 11. 1846, Landeshauptarchiv Schwerin (hereinafter
LHA SN), 4.11-1 Mecklenburg-Strel. Staatsministerium und Landesregierung Nr.
998.
11 H. HOLBORN, Deutsche Geschichte in der Neuzeit, Bd. II, München 1970, p. 273.
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professions and also craftsmen and day labourers) and also the option
of continuing their fight for civil and national rights from this country.
For this reason, Switzerland was the most suitable and popular asy-
lum for Germans. The sympathy of the population and also partially
the governments, allowed them an undisturbed residence and practi-
cally unrestricted activities. Freedom of the press permitted them to
use the newspapers and distribution of pamphlets and political liter-
ature and freedom of assembly provided the potential for unification.
This is also demonstrated by the fact that Young Germany was formed
here as the most important part of the Young Europe established by
Giuseppe Mazzini. Furthermore, the Swiss borders were only poorly
guarded and easily crossed in secret.12
The first important step toward polarisation of forces, which re-
sulted in civil war in Switzerland, was the decision by the liberal gov-
ernment of the canton of Aargau (with mixed confessions) to close all
eight monasteries in the country from January 1841. The problem of
monasteries in Aargau was rooted in political confrontation because
the new constitution prohibited the former system of parity, i.e. equal
representation of Catholics and Protestants at the Great Council. Mem-
bership in this institution was to continue to be determined only by
the current number of votes and nothing else. This provision angered
the Catholics in Aargau very much and caused them to agitate for
formation of a separate canton in which they would be the majority.
The government in Aargau responded to this agitation by arresting
several leaders of the Catholic separatists, which resulted in a wave
of unrest. It was believed that it was the monasteries that inspired
the rebellion and acted as its centre, which is why the Great Coun-
cil in Aargau voted for closure of the monasteries on 13 January 1841.
Their buildings and property were to be seized by the government
and used for schools, social care institutions and for pensions for the
retired monks, who only had two days to abandon their monasteries
in the middle of winter.13 Protests were made against this order not
only within Switzerland but also abroad, particularly by the Pope and
Austria, because one of the monasteries, Muri, was established by the
12 INAUEN, pp. 120 and 138; MÜLLER, Im Widerstreit, p. 558; MÜLLER, Die Schweiz
1847–1849, p. 316; F. FURET, Cˇloveˇk romantismu a jeho sveˇt, Praha 2010, p. 253.
13 REMAK, pp. 20–22.
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Habsburg Emperor.14 The Catholics subsequently submitted the en-
tire matter to the Diet and argued that this was not only offensive, but
also illegal because it violated the Federal Treaty, because one article
assures the continued existence of monasteries and assurance of their
property. Although the Diet voted that this was violation of the consti-
tution on 2 April 1841, the entire affair was removed from the agenda
subsequently.15
Other events that contributed to escalation of the situation in
Switzerland were the affair surrounding David Friedrich Strauss. The
government in Zurich offered this controversial German theologist a
professorship at its university at the beginning of 1839.16 Only four
days afterwards several thousand Protestants from rural areas
marched to Zurich. The liberal government was forced to resign and
the result was restoration of the conservatives and cancellation of
Strauss’ contract. The situation in Switzerland escalated to such a de-
gree that some Catholic cantons, under the leadership of Lucerne,
flirted with the idea of secession. It was also Lucerne that was the first
to initiate a counter-attack. Farmer Joseph Leu was convinced that de-
feat of the forces that threatened ancient values required disciplined
and militant organisations, such as the Society of Jesus. At his pro-
posal on 24 October 1844, the Great Council in Lucerne voted for a
resolution that invited the Jesuits to come to the country and assume
management of the seminaries here.17 This decision angered political
radicals considerably because they considered the Jesuit Order to be a
symbol of spiritual slavery and political oppression.18
Radical cantons, led by Aargau, subsequently requested that the
Diet banish all Jesuits from Swiss territories. However, the Diet re-
fused to do so, because the majority did not believe that the Federal
Treaty had been violated. At this time, when the legal methods had
failed, force was used. In December 1844 a group of radicals tried
to overthrow the government in Lucerne by force. This uprising was
14 LUTZ, p. 308; HERMAN, p. 240; MÜLLER, Die Schweiz 1847–1849, p. 291.
15 REMAK, p. 22.
16 In 1835 Strauss published a work titled The Life of Jesus (Das Leben Jesu), which was
an attempt to liberate the figure of Jesus from the Biblical legends and present only
verifiable facts in their place. Ibidem.
17 Ibidem, pp. 24–25; LUTZ, p. 308; MÜLLER,Die Schweiz 1847–1849, p. 292; HERMAN,
p. 240.
18 MÜLLER, Im Widerstreit, p. 559.
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recorded in history as the first campaign by volunteers (Freischaren-
zug).19 In March 1845 approximately 3,500 volunteers set out on an-
other campaign with weapons in their hands, under the leadership of
Bernese advocate Ulrich Ochsenbein towards Lucerne. However, both
campaigns ended in failure.20
At the same time, in 1845, the liberal-conservative government in
Zurich fell and radicals assumed government in Vaud and Bern by
force.21 On 11 December 1845, in response to this development, seven
Catholic conservative cantons (Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden,
Zug, Fribourg and Valais) agreed on establishment of a military defen-
sive alliance, the so-called Sonderbund, or Separate League, for pro-
tection of the sovereignty of the cantons. A joint the War Council with
far-reaching authority was also to be formed. The existence of the Son-
derbund was initially kept secret. It was only in June 1846 that it was
suddenly revealed. It was generally considered a violation of the Fed-
eral Treaty, because this, as mentioned above, prohibited formation of
alliances that could be directed against the Confederation.22
At the time the existence of the Sonderbund was revealed, the seat
of the Diet was in the canton of Zurich, which immediately proposed
dissolution of this organisation, but the requisite majority of 12 votes
could not be obtained for this proposal. However, in October 1846, a
liberal-radical majority regained power in Geneva, which assured 11
votes. The last vote depended on the results of elections in St. Gall in
May 1847, inwhich the liberals and the radicals won. The leadership of
the Diet was also transferred to Bern from 1 January 1847. This would
not have meant much if Ochsenbein had not been elected to the head
of the Bernese government at the same time. He became not only the
prime minister of the government, but also the chair of the Diet. In his
speech during the inauguration ceremonies on 5 July 1847 Ochsenbein
warned all foreign sympathisers of the Sonderbund who might have
been swayed to come to its aid, that this would mean intervention in
the domestic affairs of Switzerland.23
19 REMAK, p. 29; MÜLLER, Die Schweiz 1847–1849, p. 292.
20 MÜLLER, Im Widerstreit, p. 560.
21 MÜLLER, Die Schweiz 1847–1849, p. 292.
22 HERMAN, p. 240; LUTZ, p. 310; H. VALLOTTON, Metternich, Bergisch Gladbach
1978, p. 261; REMAK, pp. 52–56.
23 REMAK, pp. 58–60; T. MAISSEN, Vom Sonderbund zum Bundesstaat. Krise und Erneue-
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Thematter of the Sonderbund again made the agenda of the Diet on
19 July 1847. Its fate was decided on the second day. It was declared
incompatible with the Federal Treaty and was to be dissolved under
the threat of military intervention.24 The response from Lucerne was a
counterattack. Its envoy put forward the accusation that the enemies
of Catholic cantons were incapable of achieving a revolution from be-
low through their partisan attackers and so they tried to achieve a rev-
olution from above by initiating a federal action. In his opinion the
Diet had no right to dictate its wishes to Lucerne or its allies any more
than the partisans did. The order by the Diet dating from 16 August
1847 subsequently expressed the actual goal of most of the cantons,
federal reforms within the meaning of reinforcement of the power of
the federation and weakening of the sovereignty of the cantons. The
Sonderbund’s plans for the future were also known. Its leader, a mag-
istrate from Lucerne, Konstantin Siegwart-Müller, endeavoured to en-
large the territory of the Catholic cantons by integrating the Bernese
Highlands (or Bernese Oberland) and the Simmental and establish-
ing better territorial links between all Catholic cantons. In the field of
foreign policy his requested a clear statement from Vienna and Paris
against the majority cantons and at least a demonstration of military
force on the borders. Because the Sonderbund ignored the order of the
Diet, the majority cantons acceded to enforcement of this order by dis-
solution of the organisation by force. On 3 September 1847 the Diet
voted for banishment of the Jesuits from Switzerland by the same ma-
jority of 12 votes.25
In the middle of October 1847, the Sonderbund’s War Council is-
sued an order for mobilisation of its own army. Several days later the
Diet also ordered mobilisation of its armed forces. On 28 October a
conference of all the cantons was held in the neutral city of Basel,
which offered the last chance to maintain peace. Some of the majority
cantons offered serious concessions, the most extraordinary of these
was a proposal by St. Gall to relinquish involved in dealingwith the is-
sue of the Jesuits and letting the Pope decide whether the order could
rung 1798–1848 im Spiegel der NZZ, Zürich 1998, p. 139.
24 WARD, p. 101; G. de B. SAUVIGNY, Metternich. Staatsmann und Diplomat für Öster-
reich und den Frieden, Gernsbach 1988, p. 497; P. DU BOIS, La guerre du Sonderbund. La
Suisse de 1847, Paris 2003, p. 87.
25 LUTZ, p. 311; REMAK, pp. 49 and 62.
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remain in Lucerne. However, representatives of the Sonderbund re-
mained adamant and furthermore declared that the Diet would have
to cancel the order for mobilisation so that the meeting could con-
tinue at all. The day after the peace conferences collapsed, the Diet
was summoned at the request of the seven Catholic conservative can-
tons at which they submitted a request that the matter of the Jesuits be
removed from its agenda and that their sovereign rights confirmed,
including the right to conclude an alliance. However, most of the can-
tons refused this, which is why representatives of the Sonderbund left
the Diet meeting.26
On 4 November 1847 the Diet adopted a Decree of Implementation
(decision for execution) referring to the passage of the edict dating
from 20 July 1847 mentioning implementation of dissolution of the
Sonderbund using military force.27 General Guillaume Henri Dufour
was appointed to command the troops of the confederation, which
numbered approximately 100,000 men. The Sonderbund had just un-
der a third of these forces.28 Military operations began on 11 Novem-
ber 1847, when the Sonderbund, under the command of General
Johann Ulrich Salis-Soglio, attacked Aargau. However, the entire ven-
ture failed.29 The Catholic conservative cantons were more interested
in their own interests – protection of their own cantons against in-
vasion and keeping war expenses low – than a joint strategy. On 12
November 1847 Dufour surrounded Fribourg, which finally surren-
dered and agreed to withdraw form the Sonderbund. All Jesuits had
to abandon the canton within 48 hours. On 20 November 1847 Zug
also surrendered, voluntarily and without a struggle. The next goal of
Dufour’s strategy was now Lucerne, which capitulated on 24 Novem-
ber 1847.30
The Swiss civil war was over in less than three weeks and the Son-
derbund troops were defeated. However, the Sonderbund did not
accept this defeat. The War Council sent an appeal to Vienna request-
26 DU BOIS, p. 100; REMAK, pp. 68–71.
27 Ibidem, p. 74.
28 VALLOTTON, p. 262; DU BOIS, p. 90.
29 REMAK, p. 96.
30 Ibidem, pp. 99–103, 111–119 and 139; E. BONJOUR, Geschichte der Schweizerischen
Neutralität. Vier Jahrhunderte Eidgenössischer Aussenpolitik, I., Basel 1970, p. 199; LUTZ,
p. 312.
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ing funds and supplies the day before it was dissolved and on
2 December 1847, five days after the last canton of the Sonderbund
surrendered, from his exile in Austria Siegwart-Müller personally re-
quested that Metternich initiate immediate military intervention by
the Great Powers.31 The text of the new Swiss constitution was ex-
ecuted within six weeks between March and April 1848, and guaran-
teed formation of a two-chamber legislative assembly according to the
American example. The lower chamber was elected by the population,
the upper chamber represented the cantons. A seven-member Federal
Council and Federal Court were also established. In September the
constitution was approved by a majority of seven to one.32
One of the tasks of the Sonderbund War Council was to establish
what options there were to obtain assistance from abroad. It was be-
lieved that the Habsburg Monarchy would be able to aid in particular.
Its fear of revolutionary changes and support of conservative affairs
could transform Switzerland from an old enemy to an ally. This cal-
culation was correct.33 Metternich believed Switzerland was very im-
portant for the European peace system due to its geographic location,
because it enabled it to serve as a revolutionary transport route be-
tween France, Germany and Italy.34 While political refugees found a
refuge in the Swiss cantons, the Prince felt the need to intervene in
their affairs and supervise them.35 He declared that “the Helvetic au-
thorities welcome refugees from France, Germany and Italy, every member
of perfidious associations, instead of playing their role for the good of Europe
within the union of states”.36 He made the Swiss radicals, who strove
to trigger a revolution, responsible for the threat to peace in Europe.
The only possible means to stop these forces in his opinion was in-
tervention in the internal affairs of the Confederation. In his opinion,
31 W. BAUMGART, Europäisches Konzert und nationale Bewegung. 1830–1878, Schöningh
1999, p. 239; VALLOTTON, p. 262; S. DESMOND,Metternich. Der erste Europäer. Eine
Biographie, Zürich 1993, p. 295; REMAK, p. 156.
32 MÜLLER, Die Schweiz 1847–1849, pp. 295–296.
33 REMAK, p. 55; R. MARCOWITZ, Großmacht auf Bewährung. Die Interdependent fran-
zösischer Innen- und Außenpolitik und ihre Auswirkungen auf Frankreichs Stellung im eu-
ropäischen Konzert 1814/15–1851/52, Stuttgart 2001, p. 181.
34 BONJOUR, p. 192; VALLOTTON, p. 257.
35 WARD, p. 101.
36 H. FINK,Metternich. Staatsmann, Spieler, Kavalier, München 1989, p. 208.
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along with destruction of political radicalism, the country should also
be cleansed of political refugees.37
As in the case of Cracow, Metternich justified his interference in
Swiss domestic affairs by stating that the powers in Vienna had
granted integrity and inviolability to Switzerland in 1815 under a con-
stitution that embodied federative principles. The Swiss were able to
change this constitution if they wished, but the signatory powers re-
tained the right to examine the proposed changes and make sure that
the federative concept remained unaffected. Otherwise, if the consti-
tution was modified so greatly that it transformed the character of the
state from a loose federation into a union, the powers reserved their
right to decide whether the new constitution deserved their contin-
ued lenience and all of Switzerland the guarantee of its neutrality.38
Metternichwas of the opinion that withdrawal from the Federal Treaty
was the biggest misfortune for the Swiss nation, the result of which
was simply discord and disagreement between the Swiss, which cul-
minated in general anarchy and dissolution of existing Swiss political
bodies.39 He was concerned about the origin of a unified Switzerland,
which in his opinion was the same as France becoming an epicentre of
revolution and the enemy of conservative Austria.40
In relation to the religious unrest in Switzerland, Metternich stated
“the conflicts between confessional groups are simply an excuse for the revo-
lutionary party to realise its projects, which do not have a confessional motif,
under the condition that the term ‘confession’ is not bestowed to the subver-
sive and troublemaking political system. It is not the Protestants who wish to
overthrow the government in Lucerne, it is the radicals who now cry: ‘Away
with the Jesuits’, it is their motto, like they would have assumed any other,
which would have been provided by the circumstances”.41 He believed that
the starting point of the religious unrest within the Confederation was
37 BONJOUR, p. 192; MÜLLER, Im Widerstreit, p. 557.
38 HERMAN, p. 240; MÜLLER, Im Widerstreit, p. 562.
39 Metternich to Bombelles, Vienna, 24. 2. 1841, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Wien, Ab-
teilung Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (hereinafter AT-OeStA/HHStA), Staatenabtei-
lungen (hereinafter StAbt), Frankreich Diplomatische Korrespondenz 322.
40 VALLOTTON, p. 259.
41 Canitz to Bülow, Vienna, 24. 1. 1845, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbe-
sitz (hereinafter GStA PK), III. HA Ministerium der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten
(hereinafter III. HA MdA), I Nr. 6037/1, Politische Schriftwechsel mit der königli-
chen Gesandschaft derselbst. Wien 1845.
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not the summoning of the Jesuits for the purpose of managing the
seminars in Lucerne, but the closure of the monasteries in Aargau,
because this was violation of the rights of the cantons, whereas the
summoning of the Jesuits simply a question of the anticipation of this
decision.42
At every step the Prince was handicapped by identification of the
conservatism of the Sonderbund with its tolerance of the Jesuits.43 He
was not enthusiastic about the decision by the government of the can-
ton of Lucerne to summon the Jesuits, nor was the Pope or even the
highest representatives of the Jesuit order.44 He regretted that due to
his support of the Sonderbund, suspicions arose that he did so be-
cause this concerned Catholic cantons, which was not the real reason.
He was on their side primarily because they were against innovations
and represented the forces of order against chaos and revolution.45
Metternich was not an inflamed Catholic, but he saw a threat to Eu-
ropean order in the growing power of the democrats and centralists.46
He was also aware of the degree to which the religious issue limited
the other Great Powers in their approach to Swiss affairs. For instance,
the Berlin cabinet shared Metternich’s concerns regarding radicalism
in Switzerland and its plan for revolution in 1845. However, it could
not silently ignore the fact that Lucerne summoned the Jesuits to the
country, because it would have subjected itself to complaints from it
own Protestant population.47 The French cabinet did not stand against
the activities of the Jesuits in Switzerland but considered their sum-
moning a source of disturbance of the peace within the Confedera-
tion, and so proposed that Lucerne submit the issue of the Jesuits to
the Swiss Diet.48
In February 1845 the situation in Switzerland escalated to a signif-
icant degree and forced Metternich to declare: “Switzerland is in the
42 Metternich to Trauttmansdorff, Vienna, 24. 1. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, Staatskanzlei
(hereinafter StK), Preussen 188.
43 HERMAN, p. 241.
44 LUTZ, p. 309.
45 HERMAN, p. 240.
46 WARD, p. 101.
47 Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 24. 1. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen
187.
48 Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 17. 2. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen
187.
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most dangerous situation. There is fire smouldering at its breast, which, I
very much fear will erupt into a great inferno, in spite of the efforts that
well-meaning men undoubtedly made to maintain material peace and also
moral peace, however this does not exist in any direction.”49 In March 1845
Metternich subsequently wrote to the Austrian envoy in Berlin Joseph
von Trauttmansdorff-Weinsberg: “The situation in which the country is
now is based on several pillars of which three are dominant: the first is the
spirit of national freedom, which is typical for most people and the strength of
which is supported in the small cantons, the second is the enormous deficien-
cies in the Federal Treaty, the third element is European radicalism, which has
found a refuge in Switzerland and supresses the sense for order and practical
freedom in this misfortunate country. These causes, which jointly exert the
most fatal influence on Switzerland, must be supplemented by the erroneous
French policy, which is constantly occupied with application of its exclusive
political influence on neighbouring countries, maintaining the spirit of dis-
order within them. The Federation is under the influence of a godless sect,
which has named itself Young Switzerland.”50
In the same year the Sonderbund requested support from the Aus-
trian Chancellor by provision of weapons and funds.Metternichwrote
about this matter: “The Lucerne government contacted me to obtain weap-
ons and funds in secret, or at least one or the other. It requests delivery of
two thousand weapons and a loan [. . .] of 500,000 Swiss Francs, because its
treasury is completely empty.”51 At Metternich’s behest some Austrian
military units were transferred from Tyrol to the border of the canton
of Ticino and the Catholic cantons of the Sonderbund were provided
with an interest-free loan of half a million francs and also 3,000 guns
and about 75 kg of ammunition, which were stored in the Milanese
armouries. However, this cargo was seized at the Ticino borders by
the Protestants.52 Far reaching coercive means were also considered in
Vienna, such as interruption of all trade between Switzerland and the
surrounding states, which would force the radical and liberal forces to
49 Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 19. 2. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen
187.
50 Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 12. 3. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen
187.
51 BONJOUR, p. 193.
52 FINK, p. 209.
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capitulate.53 It must also be mentioned that the chancellor faced con-
siderable criticism in Vienna from Austrian Statesman Count Franz
Anton von Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky and President of the Imperial Ex-
chequer Karl Friedrich Kübeck, whowere of the opinion that the Swiss
separatists were simply disconcerted by assurance of the influence of
the Jesuits and did not understand why Austria should provide fi-
nancial aid or even military support, in this issue. Metternich repeat-
edly declared that the dispute embodies greater competition within
Europe, that the Sonderbund defends the traditional values of society
threatened by radical democrats and that if these seven cantons are
defeated, this would encourage liberals across the continent to trigger
a revolution. The State Conference finally, and very reluctantly, au-
thorised that ten thousand Austrian troops be gathered at the Swiss
borders and offered the Sonderbund an interest-free loan.54
Metternich declared that the unremitting work of the sects would
now be revealed, that the masses are agitated, the governments of the
cantons are overcome, their authority is zero and empty and it would
only be a question of time when the fires would erupt in several places
in Switzerland. However, if Europe was unprepared for these events it
would either must make concessions or permit the political and social
order in Switzerland to be overthrown and face the consequences of
this development.55 TheAustrian Chancellor believed that at this time,
demonstration of complete moral accord between the five Great Pow-
ers was of the greatest importance, followed by loud expressed accord
between the two neighbouring states of Switzerland, France and Aus-
tria. In relation to this, the Prince declared that if civil war broke out
in Switzerland, this would be a much smaller threat to Austria than to
France and the smaller states of the German Confederation. His belief
was based on the assumption that radicalism in these countries would
respond to events in Switzerland much more intensively than in the
Austrian lands.56
53 MÜLLER, Im Widerstreit, p. 562.
54 PALMER, p. 301.
55 Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 3. 7. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen
187.
56 Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 19. 2. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen
187; Metternich to Dietrichstein, Vienna, 28. 10. 1846, AT-OeStA/HHStA, Diploma-
tie und Außenpolitik 1848–1918, Gesandtschafts- und Konsulatarchiv B, Gesandt-
schaftsarchiv Bern 38.
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However, Austria did not have sufficient military forces enabling
it to intervene in Switzerland alone.57 According to the Prince, such
intervention would have to be realised in the closest possible coopera-
tion with the other Great Powers, particularly France.58 The European
powers should agree on the following points:
1. Transfer of diplomatic bodies from Bern,
2. decisive declaration that the inactivity of the Great Powers has
its limits,
3. following the attack of Lucerne, execution of armed intervention
at the request of the Sonderbund.
This escalating plan was fully approved in Berlin and Saint Peters-
burg.59 However, London adopted a principle of non-intervention.
The value of Switzerland’s independence and neutrality to the system
of British PrimeMinister Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston
was in its performance of its assigned role as buffer state between Aus-
tria and France. Therefore, it was so persistently against all attempts
by these two powers to interfere in Swiss domestic affairs. It was in the
interests of British foreign policy, at that time exclusively determined
by Palmerston, to support free-thinking movements worldwide.
Therefore, British statesman also acted as a protector of liberals in the
case of Switzerland. However, his motive was his consideration of the
British economy, which required peace in Europe to flourish, on the
contrary armed intervention by Austria and France could easily cause
it harm.60
Without the knowledge of France’s support, Metternich believed
it impossible to take strict action against the Confederation, which is
why he was most interested in an agreement with French King Louis
Philippe I and French Minister of Foreign Affairs François Pierre
Guillaume Guizot.61 If France were convinced to participate in the in-
tervention, the ideas of the Sonderbund would be able to predomi-
57 HERMAN, p. 241.
58 LUTZ, p. 311.
59 MÜLLER, Im Widerstreit, p. 565.
60 BONJOUR, pp. 193–195.
61 H. RIEBEN, Prinzipiengrundlage und Diplomatie inMetternichs Europapolitik 1815–1848,
Aarau 1942, p. 165.
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nate in Switzerland. However, in 1845 he complained that the French
King, like Guizot, frequently repeated to Austrian Diplomat Anton
von Apponyi that France agrees with Austria, but the French envoy
in Vienna was never authorised to impart this opinion personally and
furthermore practically did not discuss Switzerland with the Chan-
cellor at all.62 But Metternich did not let himself be deceived by this
French tactic and did not rely on a truly absolute accord with the
French government in this matter: “This [French] government cannot
be strong in relation to the fight against revolution, it cannot stand beside
us and hold the same line with us, it would be against its nature.”63 The
Prince was of the opinion that Louis Philippe and Guizot could be
as conservative as they liked, but the French people would basically
remain liberal. Intervention could therefore provoke a union between
the French and Swiss radicals and light a revolutionary fire that would
end in European-wide war. He therefore realised that he could not rely
too much on French military support. But he did hope in their diplo-
matic assistance at least.64 At the same time he could not permit France
to become isolated or to fall into open opposition against Austria.65
With regard to the escalating situation in Switzerland Metternich
proposed that the Great Powers should accept a joint solution, which
should be a clear manifest.66 The energetic tone of the joint explana-
tion of four continental Great Powers, that they would not permit an
attack against the sovereignty of the cantons, seemed to be an infalli-
ble means to avoid escalation of the conflict. However, he was unable
to convince Paris of this idea. Domestic opinion and consideration of
Great Britain did not permit Louis Philippe to take part in the threat-
ing note to the conservative forces.67 Guizot also believed that this was
not the right time to realise intervention because this would cause
significant harm to Swiss national feelings and intervention would
face strong resistance. For this reason, the envoys of the three Eastern
powers were forced to proceed alone. On 10 January 1846 they
62 Canitz to Bülow, Vienna, 5. 3. 1845, GStA PK, III. HA MdA, I Nr. 6037/1.
63 Ibidem.
64 HERMAN, p. 241.
65 Metternich to Trauttmansdorff, Vienna, 20. 5. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen
187.
66 HERMAN, p. 241.
67 RIEBEN, p. 166.
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submitted a clear note to the government in Bern, in which they identi-
fied maintenance of the Federal Treaty to be a condition for continued
amicable relations. Bern responded to this challenge by permitting es-
tablishment of a radical regiment and appointing Ochsenbein as its
commander. He responded to the challenge by the Great Powers as fol-
lows: “The suburbs [of Bern]will consider whether to continue maintaining
good relations [with the conservative powers], it strongly protests against
each potential attempt to intervene.”68 The next two notes by the eastern
Great Powers followed on 10 and 11 January 1847 and warned against
an attack against the conservative cantons. In a response sent to them
on 14 January 1847 from Bern, the inviolability of Swiss sovereignty
was defended again and any attempt to interfere in the domestic af-
fairs of Switzerland was decisively rebuffed.69
Because the situation in Switzerland escalated further during 1847,
Guizot proposed that Austria intervene alone when civil war broke
out and that France would then follow. What Guizot proposed was
an evident repetition of Ancona and Metternich could not permit this.
The radicals could possibly interpret this procedure by France as a
hostile act towardsAustria, whichwouldmean that Francewould find
itself in the role of protector of Switzerland and Austria in the role of
suppressor of freedom.70 When this attempt failed, Guizot decided to
promote a joint diplomatic intervention by the Great Powers. On 7/8
November 1847 he sent a note to London, Berlin, Vienna and Saint
Petersburg in which he justified the right of the European Great Pow-
ers to intervene in Swiss matters because it was they who guaranteed
the neutrality of Switzerland at the Congress of Vienna. He proposed
that all hostile actions be immediately ceased, the matter of the Jesuits
passed on to the Pope and representatives of both hostile Swiss par-
ties be invited to a conference of the five Great Powers for the purpose
of resolving political issues. The Prussian King agreed but requested
that the aforementioned conference take place in Neuchâtel instead
of Baden, because he wished to maintain the neutrality of his princi-
68 BONJOUR, p. 193.
69 MÜLLER, Im Widerstreit, p. 565.
70 Metternich to Kaisersfeld, Vienna, 1. 7. 1847, AT-OeStA/HHStA, Diplomatie und
Außenpolitik 1848–1918, Gesandtschafts- und Konsulatarchiv B, Gesandtschafts-
archiv Bern 38; Ch. de MAZADE, Un chancelier d’ancien régime. Le régne diplomatique
de M. de Metternich, Paris 1889, p. 387.
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pality.Metternich considered this proposal insufficient.71 Palmerston’s
negative reaction continued to be an expression of his defeat in the
Spanish affair. There were also very fresh memories of the annexation
of Cracow and because Palmerston certainly did not want Switzerland
to turn out like Poland, he promoted the principle of non-intervention
again. In spite of this London and Paris worked on the exact wording
of an identical note by the Great Powers to Switzerland.72
Palmerston proposed that a conference be held in London for the
purpose of restoring peace. He set the following conditions: banish-
ment of the Jesuits from Switzerland, maintenance of the principle of
the sovereignty of the cantons, dissolution of the Sonderbund and im-
mediate dissolution of military units. However, this proposal did not
correspond with Guizot’s ideas and so somemodifications were made
to it. In the end an agreement was reached on a unanimous note on 20
November 1847, which was to be addressed to the Diet. According to
this note the Sonderbund should ask the Holy See to withdraw the Je-
suits from Switzerland, the sovereignty of the cantons was to be main-
tained and the Federal Treaty modified only with the consent of all the
cantons. Thanks to Palmerston’s efforts the note also had an attach-
ment appended which determined that refusal of the Great Powers’
proposal would not be punished by armed intervention.73 The note
was submitted to the Swiss government on 30 November 1847. How-
ever, Great Britain failed to participate with the other Great Powers
at the last minute, which was received with outrage. However, at this
time the note from the Great Powers was no longer decisive, because
there was no longer any Sonderbund War Council, which it could
be addressed to and the war had ended. The Diet finally simply ex-
pressed its thanks for the offer of mediation, but there was no longer
anything to mediate. The main reason the note dated 30 November
arrived so late was because Palmerston delayed it.74
Metternich made a fatal mistake when he based his actions on the
discord between Great Britain and France in relation to the Affair of
the Spanish Marriages. He believed that he did not have to take Great
71 Arnim to Frederick William IV, Vienna, 18. 11. 1847, GStA PK, III. HA MdA, I Nr.
6037/3.
72 LUTZ, p. 312.
73 BONJOUR, p. 199.
74 Ibidem, p. 201; LUTZ, p. 312; REMAK, p. 156.
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Britain into consideration because it was in isolation and he also did
not believe that it would be possible to convince the British cabinet
to participate in the planned threatening note. Because of this he had
decided to act without it. He was so concerned with Louis Philippe
and Guizot that he left Palmerston aside. He did not endeavour to
reach an agreement between the five Great Powers in the Swiss affair.
He believed that this would be in vain. However, his belief that Great
Britain would not be interested in events on the continent or would
let itself be isolated, were completely wrong.75 Metternich himself ac-
cused France of the failure of intervention by the Great Powers, be-
cause it initiated negotiations with Great Britain.76 On 12 December
1847 Metternich wrote: “The key principle of the Confederation has been
violated. The Sonderbundkrieg was not an issue of religion, but a conspiracy
of the revolutionary forces for the purpose of overthrowing legal order. The
radicals’ plan is clearly revealed: to destroy seven cantons morally and mate-
rially and if these cantons are then relegated to a condition dependent on and
subject to the political establishment, the explanation will be that the Federal
Acts were reformed.”77
Metternich now devoted his full attention to at least limiting the
consequences of the victory of the federal forces to the minimum and
to Switzerland achieving a form that would be compatible with its
state system.78 He recommended concurrent intervention by the Euro-
pean powers, whereas Ticino was to be occupied by Austrian troops,
Bale by the German Confederation, Jura by France and Geneva by Sar-
dinia. However, if the Diet assured the Great Powers of the guaran-
teed inviolability of the cantons, this intervention would no longer be
necessary.79 The only thing the Prince achieved in the end was exe-
cution of a joint note, which France, Austria and Prussia, addressed
to the Swiss Diet on 18 January 1848, in which they demanded that
the Federal Treaty be respected, the sovereignty of the 22 cantons be
respected, the principle of unanimousness when enforcing changes to
the Federal Treaty andwithdrawal of federal troops under the threat of
intervention. The note also contained a thesis proposed byMetternich,
75 RIEBEN, p. 166.
76 Ibidem, p. 169.
77 FINK, p. 209.
78 RIEBEN, p. 169.
79 Ch. ZORGBIBE,Metternich. Le séducteur diplomate, Paris 2009, p. 470.
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according to which the Great Powers provided its eternal neutrality in
1815 in relation to the concluded Federal Treaty, and if the Swiss failed
to fulfil their duties, the same powers would have the indisputable
right to accept measures essential for assuring their own safety.80
The Swiss government responded with clear refusal and empha-
sised the neutrality and also the independence of individual cantons
and the Swiss Confederation itself.81 Metternich was understandably
not assured by this response. During a walk he explained to his wife
Melanie: “I would like to die and no longer experience the misfortune, which
no man can avoid. My role is at an end, the role of all human cleverness has
ended. Force will prevail and the world is lost, because law will become sim-
ply a subject for laughter to the world.”82 Metternich’s absolute inability
to prevent the triumph of liberalism and a unified state in Switzerland
was clear evidence that his influence on the events in Europe were
now nearing zero.83 The defeat of the Sonderbund humiliated Metter-
nich and dealt a fatal blow to Austria, because it provided an impulse
for rebellion in Italy.84 The national movement of the Swiss Confedera-
tion therefore violated the Treaties of Vienna from 1815 without being
punished.85
In October 1847 Metternich feared that developments in Switzer-
land could become an impulse for the national unification of Ger-
many.86 In order to prevent this he wanted to realise a plan of
encirclement, intimidate the Swiss Diet and prevent the impending
defeat of the Sonderbund.87 At the wishes of the conservative party
in Switzerland, Vienna accepted a decision to distribute military units
along the Swiss border from Lake Constance to Lombardy. Metternich
believed that Paris would participate in these measures and reinforce
its units on the borders with Switzerland and urged the governments
of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden to take the same measures. If this
had happened, Switzerland would have found itself encircled.88 The
80 RIEBEN, p. 170; BONJOUR, p. 204; LUTZ, p. 313.
81 DU BOIS, p. 159.
82 FINK, p. 210.
83 HERMAN, p. 242.
84 DESMOND, p. 295; A. BÉTHOUART,Metternich et l’Europe, Paris 1979, p. 379.
85 O.DANN,Nation undNationalismus in Deutschland. 1770–1990, München 1992, p. 115.
86 FINK, p. 208.
87 MÜLLER, Im Widerstreit, pp. 567–568.
88 Arnim to Frederick William IV, Vienna, 8. 10. 1847, GStA PK, III. HA MdA, I Nr.
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courts of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden were asked to move sev-
eral units to the border, which would not cause them great expense
according to Metternich. The King of Württemberg showed his good
will, but the Archduke of Baden created difficulties, which were com-
pletely unjustified according to the Prince. If a military unit had been
sent to Lake Constance it would not have cost much and would have
made an impression of the canton of Thurgau.89 Not even the Bavarian
King was willing to take the proposedmeasures, even though, accord-
ing to Metternich, this simply concerned dispatching one battalion to
Lindau, the only city in Bavaria that was near Switzerland.90 Metter-
nich tried to explain to the Munich cabinet that sending a small num-
ber of units to Vorarlberg was clear proof that this was not a military
operation, but an act of a purely moral character.91
Metternich tried to convince the South German rulers using state-
ments that the borders of their states with Switzerland aremostly open
and a partially in contact with the area where Catholics and Protes-
tants live together and that potential confessional conflicts would take
place near their borers. He also argued that the propaganda of Ger-
man refugees arriving from Paris had already chosen regions of Lake
Constance as a gathering site for their hateful actions against Germany
and that there was no certainty that Swiss radicals would not invade
Germany. For this reason, the South German states should be prepared
and should distribute military units along certain points of the Swiss
borders, which would be strong enough to resist the first flood of the
revolutionary hordes from Switzerland. As a result, the local radicals
would realise that the residents of Germany are vigilant and unified
in their decision to observe the conflict as a silent but invulnerable
witness.92 The Berlin cabinet also supported acceptance of preventive
measures by the South German courts and endeavoured to convince
the governments in Munich, Stuttgart and Karlsruhe of the adequacy
of the proposed preventive measures.93 The only thing that Metter-
6037/3.
89 Arnim to Frederick William IV, Vienna, 4. 11. 1847, GStA PK, III. HA MdA, I Nr.
6037/3.
90 Arnim to Frederick William IV, Vienna, 19. 10. 1847, GStA PK, III. HA MdA, I Nr.
6037/3.
91 Metternich to Senfft, Vienna, 26. 3. 1845, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Bayern 177.
92 Metternich to Ugarte, Vienna, 8. 10. 1847, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Württemberg 38.
93 Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 13. 10. 1847, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK,
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nich managed to enforce was acceptance of the essential measures to
secure the borders of the Habsburg Monarchy. Armed forces of ap-
proximately 4,000 men were to be placed under the command of Gen-
eral Major Earl Felix Lichnowsky and sent to Vorarlberg.94
The Berlin cabinet officially supported Metternich in the Swiss af-
fair but managed to do so very guardedly in practice until the au-
tumn of 1847. In June 1846 Canitz declared that he sees no salvation
for Switzerland and that restoring peace in the country would only
be possible thanks to its military occupation by Austria and France.
He believed that this occupation and respect of religious profession
to be the only effective means for suppressing evil within the Hel-
vetic Confederation.95 Frederick William IV expressed himself even
more sharply when he wrote to Queen Victoria that saving Switzer-
land from the hands of the radicals would be a matter of absolutely
fundamental importance, because if godlessness and lawlessness won
in the civil war, then rivers of blood would also flow in Germany, be-
cause thousands of criminals had emigrated to the country and were
simply waiting for a signal to overflow far past the borders of Ger-
many where this godless band would wander through Germany with
the intention of killing kings, priests and aristocrats.96
However, in 1847 Canitz stood determinedly against the concept of
the demonstrative removal of diplomatic representation of the east-
ern powers from Switzerland favoured by Metternich and Count Karl
Robert Nesselrode and called it an impractical measure. Prussia de-
cided to stand up for its own interests, over the interests of the en-
tire conservative camp. It was particularly interested in maintaining
the Prussian position in Neuchâtel, in a Prussian principality where
Prussia had not been able to position its own units for the time being.
The governor of Neuchâtel gave the border authorities a strict order to
prevent any supplies or weapons intended for the Sonderbund from
passing through and to send those that had already arrived back to
Preussen 193; Trauttmansdorff toMetternich, Berlin, 17. 10. 1847, AT-OeStA/HHStA,
StK, Preussen 193.
94 Canitz to Bülow, Vienna, 5. 3. 1845, GStA PK, III. HA MdA, I Nr. 6037/1.
95 Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, 12. 6. 1846, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen
190.
96 REMAK, p. 155; F. HERRE, Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Der andere Preußenkönig, Gernsbach
2007, p. 109.
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France.97 He did so because he did not wish to provoke the liberal
cantons in attacking Neuchâtel. This thwarted Metternich’s intention
to supply the Sonderbund with weapons and military material for the
oncoming conflicts.98
It was only in November 1847 that Vienna and Berlin were able
to fully agree on the risk posed by the potential spread of political
radicalism from Switzerland into the territories of the German Con-
federation. These concerns were certainly not unfounded because im-
mediately after the war erupted, a strong solidarity movement
directed against the endeavours of the Great Powers to reverse so-
cial development in Switzerland, developedwithin the German states.
During the period between 7 November 1847 and the end of Febru-
ary 1848 over 50 statements of solidarity were addressed to the Swiss
Diet, numbering over 5,000 signatures of people from all social lev-
els of the population. This addressal movement began on 9 November
1847, when Karel Mathy conceived an address signed by moderate
liberals and democrats in Manheim and basically formulated it with
even more restraint, whereas it emphasised the legality of the proce-
dure by the Diet in Frankfurt am Main and simply mentioned the is-
sue of the Jesuits. The central concept of many addresses fromGerman
democrats was the concept of unification of the European nations in
the fight against a common enemy and emphasis on Switzerland as an
example.99 In one of the addressed “to our Swiss friends and brothers” is
boldly declared: “Your fight, noble people, is for the most important of all
things, it is a fight for the principles of the highest order. Your affairs are our
affairs, your enemies, our enemies.”100 It was signed collectively “citizens
and residents of Leipzig”, including Robert Blum for instance.101 The of-
fer of armed assistance to the Swiss Diet also appeared as a response
to the Great Powers’ plans for intervention.102
The civil war in Switzerland applied to all friends of unification and
freedom in Germany as a challenge to their own activities.103 It had a
97 MÜLLER, Im Widerstreit, p. 569.
98 Ibidem, p. 570; DU BOIS, pp. 159–160; Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin,
6. 11. 1847, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 193; Trauttmansdorff to Metternich,
Berlin, 9. 12. 1847, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StK, Preussen 193.
99 MÜLLER, Im Widerstreit, pp. 573–576.
100 REMAK, p. 176.
101 Ibidem.
102MÜLLER, Im Widerstreit, p. 576.
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powerful effect mainly in the south of Germany and completely in the
spirit of verses by German poet Ferdinand Freiligrath, promising that
gunshots from the heights of Switzerland would lead to the unstop-
pable movement of an avalanche, which would finally crush all the
forts of response and break the chains of the nations.104 Freiligrath
celebrated the Swiss victory as a herald of the freedom in Germany
and everywhere in the world, from London.105 In a poem written on
25 February 1848 he declared: “Its cries will thunder through Germany
and no lightening bolt can melt it.”106 The poem titled German Republican
Song (Deutsches Republikanerlied) celebrated the victory in Switzerland
as a spark for the opposition in other countries.107
Metternich was very restrained with regard to the German Confed-
eration’s possible involvement in Swiss affairs, because he feared that
this involvement might go in the wrong direction. He again pointed
out its purely defensive character and that it was not a force that
would be involved in conferences or political congresses. A conver-
sation that the Prussian Envoy in Vienna had with Metternich gave
the impression that, according to the Prince, the German Confedera-
tion should not be involved in Swiss affairs before the powers know
what it intended to do.108
However, Heinrich von Bülow, a Prussian statesman and Minister
of Foreign affairs until 1845, was inclined to take every opportunity
to give the German Confederation political authority and increase its
importance by revealing itself to the world as a power. In the end he
was forced to acknowledge that the procedure proposed by Metter-
nich was correct. The Berlin cabinet agreed that at the present the Ger-
man Confederation should bide its time face to face with the Swiss
movement, but as soon as its domestic relations threatened order in
Germany, both German Great powers should request that the Confed-
eration take action. Trauttmansdorff thought that it would be difficult
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to assume that the revolution in Switzerland would lead to its export
into neighbouring countries, because the Swiss liberals and democrats
concentrated too much on their own affairs. However, there would
be a great risk if radicalism predominated and utilised its existing
connections with Germany to move the revolutionary movement to
German soil.109
Metternich joined the Prussian court in the opinion that, for many
reasons, it would be appropriate to award the German Confederation
the corresponding position towards Switzerland in the present situa-
tion. In his opinion the German Confederation could naturally act as a
congress power but could also appear as a neighbouring country pro-
tecting the German federal territories. Both German powers agreed
that they would submit the Swiss affair to the Diet in Frankfurt am
Main.110 Even though the Diet began to discuss the Swiss affair, it was
not capable of making any progress, because this was prevented by
the general progress of the Swiss civil war.111
Conclusion
Metternich believed Switzerland to be of great importance to the Euro-
pean peace system due to its geographic position, because the country
formed an important barrier between France, Germany and Italy. He
also considered it necessary to intervene in its domestic affairs due to
the presence of a large number of political refugees from other coun-
tries, who had found asylum on Swiss soil. The Austrian Chancellor
was of the opinion that the only possible measure to stop the radi-
cal forces, which endeavoured to trigger a revolution and threatened
peace throughout Europe, was intervention in the domestic affairs
of the Confederation. However, he was aware that Austria did not
have sufficient military power enabling it to intervene in Switzerland
alone. According to the Prince, such intervention would have to be
realised in the closest possible cooperation with other powers, partic-
ularly France. The only thing he managed to achieve was to address a
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unanimous note from the powers to the Swiss Diet in November 1847.
But this note was intentionally delayed by Great Britain, which did not
even participate with the other countries in the end, and so the note
practically lost its significance, because the Swiss civil war had been
decided by that time.
The Austrian statesman failed in his efforts to achieve intervention
by the Great Powers, the Sonderbund was defeated and Switzerland
adopted a new Federal Constitution. His absolute helplessness in pre-
venting the triumph of liberalism and a unified state in Switzerland
was evidence that his influence on events in Europe was nearing zero.
Metternichmade a fatal error when he based his actions on the discord
between Great Britain and France in relation to the Affair of the Span-
ish Marriages. He believed that he would not have to count on Great
Britain, because it was isolated. The Prince was no more successful in
his efforts to convince the other Great Powers to carry out additional
concurrent intervention during which Ticino was to be occupied by
Austrian troops, Bale by the German Confederation, Jura by France
and Geneva by Sardinia. He simply achieved execution of a joint note,
which France, Austria and Prussia addressed to the Swiss Diet on 18
January 1848.
The fact that he was unable to convince the German neighbours
of Switzerland to take part in his plan of encirclement and convince
them to position military troops along the borders played a signifi-
cant role in Metternich’s failure. His warnings against potential insti-
gation of a revolutionary movement in these states by Swiss radicals
did not fall on fertile ground, because the South German states were
concerned about the financial expenses linked to deployment of their
armed forces. The only thing he managed to enforce in the end was
acceptance of the essential measures to secure the borders of the Habs-
burg Monarchy. It is also important to point out the fact that Prussia,
the traditional and most loyal ally of Austria, also gave precedence
to its own interests over those of the entire conservative camp in this
conflict whereas it was most interested in maintaining the Prussian
position in Neuchâtel. Prussia’s actions resulted in Metternich’s plan
to supply the Sonderbund with weapons and military material being
thwarted. The defeat of the Sonderbund humiliated Metternich and
dealt a fatal blow to Austria, because it became an impulse for erup-
tion of the revolution in 1848 in Germany and Italy.
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